> ## Documentation Index > Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://docs.userkit.dev/llms.txt > Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further. # Read the staff audit trail > Requires `audit:read`. What staff did inside this organization, newest first: who acted, what they did, which object they did it to, when, and from where. Entries come from the platform's internal event bus rather than from each endpoint writing its own, which has two consequences worth knowing. An action is recorded a moment after it succeeds, never during the request that performed it. And the trail is **append-only**: no endpoint edits or removes an entry, and neither does anything else. Recording is never conditional on a plan, and neither is keeping: every organization's trail is retained for the same period. What a plan changes is how far back this read looks, reported as `window_days` — so entries beyond it are hidden rather than deleted, and a plan that lengthens the window shows the history that was always there. ## OpenAPI ````yaml /api-reference/openapi.json get /v1/organization/audit-events openapi: 3.1.0 info: title: UserKit API version: 1.0.0 description: >- The HTTP surface of UserKit. Two planes share one API. The **staff plane** is what a human uses in the panel: users, organizations, roles, members, keys. The **customer plane** is what a developer's own product uses: contacts, identities, hosted or federated sign-in. Every error answers the same envelope — `{"error": {"code", "message"}}`. The `code` is a stable contract to branch on; the `message` is for a person and may change. servers: - url: '{baseUrl}' description: The API host. variables: baseUrl: default: https://api.userkit.dev description: Base URL of the API, no trailing slash. security: - sessionToken: [] tags: - name: Authentication description: >- Public sign-up, sign-in, two-factor and password recovery for staff accounts. - name: Session description: >- The active session: who the caller is, which organization they are in, and signing out. - name: Account description: The caller's own account — profile, password, sessions, avatar. - name: Two-factor description: >- TOTP setup, activation and recovery codes. Returns 501 when two-factor is unavailable on the server. - name: Organizations description: The organizations a user belongs to, and the active one. - name: Environments description: >- The live and test environments seeded with every organization, and their identity settings. - name: Members description: Memberships and invitations. - name: Roles description: Roles and the permission catalogue they draw from. - name: Audit log description: >- What staff did inside an organization. Append-only, and read behind its own permission. - name: API keys description: Secret keys (`uk_sk_…`) and publishable keys (`uk_pk_…`). - name: Contacts (staff session) description: >- The staff view of the customer plane, opened by a staff session. Reads take `?environment=` as an explicit view parameter. - name: Contacts (API key) description: >- The machine surface, authenticated by an API key. The environment is the key's environment and cannot be named by the caller. - name: Customer plane description: >- Called from the developer's own pages with a publishable key: boot, magic link, and the contact's own session. - name: Hosted auth description: >- Sign-up, sign-in, verification and recovery for contacts, when UserKit owns the account. - name: Customer teams description: >- A customer is a team. Its roster, its invitations and its two roles — owner and member — administered by the contact's own session. The active customer travels in `X-Customer-Id`. - name: Webhooks description: >- Outbound webhooks: endpoints, the published event catalogue, the delivery log, replay and test sends. Never gated by a plan — webhooks are a developer primitive. - name: Catalogue description: >- The plans, prices and features **you** sell to your own customers. Per environment, a price per currency, and `recurring` or `one_time`. Distinct from the plan you are on with UserKit, which is `GET /v1/organization/entitlements`. - name: Subscriptions description: >- What one of **your** customers is paying you, mirrored from the gateway that charges them. The gateway is the truth about money — it holds the schedule, runs the retries and decides what a proration is worth — so these routes ask it to change something and answer with what it then said. `provider_synced_at` is how stale the copy admits to being. - name: Provider webhooks description: >- Where a payment provider delivers to. Not a surface you call — it is a URL you paste into the provider's dashboard, which is why it sits outside `/v1`: a version bump must never mean editing a setting in somebody else's product. Signed with the secret of the connection named in the path, and safe to retry. - name: Entitlements description: >- What one of **your** customers may do, resolved: the plan their subscription carries, plus the overrides you promised them on top. This is the read your own gate calls, so it is cached and answers in one round trip. It is a different question from `GET /v1/organization/entitlements`, which is the plan **you** are on with UserKit — two catalogues, same word, different money. paths: /v1/organization/audit-events: get: tags: - Audit log summary: Read the staff audit trail description: >- Requires `audit:read`. What staff did inside this organization, newest first: who acted, what they did, which object they did it to, when, and from where. Entries come from the platform's internal event bus rather than from each endpoint writing its own, which has two consequences worth knowing. An action is recorded a moment after it succeeds, never during the request that performed it. And the trail is **append-only**: no endpoint edits or removes an entry, and neither does anything else. Recording is never conditional on a plan, and neither is keeping: every organization's trail is retained for the same period. What a plan changes is how far back this read looks, reported as `window_days` — so entries beyond it are hidden rather than deleted, and a plan that lengthens the window shows the history that was always there. operationId: listStaffAuditEvents parameters: - $ref: '#/components/parameters/OrganizationHeader' - name: before in: query required: false schema: type: integer format: int64 description: >- The `sequence` of the oldest entry you already hold. Paging by sequence keeps a page stable while new actions land above it. responses: '200': description: One page of the trail, newest first. content: application/json: schema: type: object properties: events: type: array items: type: object properties: id: type: string format: uuid sequence: type: integer format: int64 description: Global and monotonic. Also the paging cursor. type: type: string description: >- What happened, as `aggregate.fact` — `role.updated`, `api_key.revoked`, `member.role_changed`. New kinds appear over time; treat an unfamiliar one as an entry you cannot label rather than as an error. actor: type: object description: >- Who did it. The address is the one the account carried at the time, so the entry still answers "who" after the account is gone. properties: user_id: type: string format: uuid email: type: string ip: type: string user_agent: type: string target: type: object description: What was acted on. properties: type: type: string id: type: string format: uuid payload: type: object description: >- Detail of the action, shaped by its type. Identifiers, never credentials: a key's prefix appears here, a key never does. occurred_at: type: string format: date-time has_more: type: boolean description: Whether older entries exist below this page. window_days: type: - integer - 'null' format: int64 description: >- How far back this read looked, in days, as the plan allows. `null` means it looked through everything the trail still holds. Entries older than the window are retained and unreadable, never removed — the trail is kept for the same period on every plan. example: events: - id: … sequence: 4821 type: member.role_changed actor: user_id: … email: ana@acme.dev ip: 203.0.113.7 user_agent: Mozilla/5.0 … target: type: membership id: … payload: role_id: … changed_by: … occurred_at: '2026-07-29T14:02:11Z' has_more: false window_days: 30 '401': $ref: '#/components/responses/Unauthorized' '403': $ref: '#/components/responses/Forbidden' components: parameters: OrganizationHeader: name: X-Organization-Id in: header required: false schema: type: string description: >- The organization the caller is acting on — the `org_…` code that appears in the panel URL. It *identifies*; the membership JOIN is what *authorizes*, so a forged code reads nothing. Absent, the session's default organization answers. responses: Unauthorized: description: >- `unauthorized` — missing, malformed or expired credential. A well-formed credential from the wrong family says so: "this endpoint expects a staff session token, not an organization API key". content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/Error' Forbidden: description: '`forbidden` — your role does not allow this action.' content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/Error' schemas: Error: type: object description: Every error in this API answers this envelope. properties: error: type: object properties: code: type: string description: Stable. Branch on this. message: type: string description: For a person. May change. required: - code - message required: - error example: error: code: forbidden message: your role does not allow this action securitySchemes: sessionToken: type: http scheme: bearer description: >- A staff session token, `uk_st_…`. Minted by sign-up, sign-in or the two-factor exchange. ````